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I. Introduction and Summary 
 
In 2017, the Federal Communications Commission adopted the Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order (RIF Order), which repealed the Commission’s two-year-old net neutrality restrictions.1 
This action spawned a flurry of activity in state legislatures that sought to re-impose those 
restrictions at the state level and subject the RIF Order to a death by a thousand paper cuts. 
Nowhere was this state activity more prominent than California, where Senate Bill 822 became a 
vehicle for net neutrality advocates not only to resurrect the requirements of the now-defunct 
2015 Open Internet Order,2 but also to impose additional regulations that even the Obama-era 
FCC had rejected.3  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Justice Department challenged SB-822 in federal court in California, arguing 
that federal law preempted the state’s attempt to regulate the Internet from Sacramento.4 In 
response, California agreed to voluntarily stay enforcement of the statute while the D.C. Circuit 
heard Mozilla v. FCC, which was considering the validity of the FCC’s RIF Order.5 For almost 
two years, California’s bold net neutrality initiative has been in limbo, with supporters and critics 





With the Mozilla litigation now complete, the day of reckoning is approaching – and the 
California court is likely to find that much, if not all, of SB-822 is preempted. At a minimum, the 
Communications Act expressly preempts most of the regulations that SB-822 places on wireless 
companies. More generally, the state law interferes with the carefully calibrated federal 
broadband policy determined in the RIF Order, and on that basis should face conflict preemption 
by the Supremacy Clause. These claims, which Mozilla left open,7 are fatal to much, if not all, of 
California’s attempt to regulate broadband network management practices.  
 
II. California’s Net Neutrality Law Explained 
 
California’s foray into broadband regulation began as an effort to undo the RIF Order. As noted 
above, the RIF Order repealed the 2015 Open Internet Order and restored the light-touch 
regulatory framework that governed much of the broadband industry since its inception. In 
response, California passed SB-822, the California Internet Consumer Protection and Net 
Neutrality Act of 2018. California Senate President or Tempore Kevin de Leon, a bill sponsor, 
was open about the fact that the bill’s purpose was to undo the effect of the RIF Order: “When 
Washington, D.C. abandons its obligation to protect American consumers…California must step 
up and do D.C.’s job.”8 Similarly, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s bill analysis began by 
explaining that “This bill would codify portions of the recently-rescinded Federal 
Communications Commission rules protecting ‘net neutrality.’”9 
 
SB-822 was part of a larger movement by activists to recreate at the state level various 
regulations that had been repealed by the federal government. In the communications realm, 
three other states (Washington, Oregon, and Vermont) adopted some form of a net neutrality 
statute in 2018,10 while governors in six states issued executive orders purporting to compel 
broadband providers to abide by net neutrality requirements.11 Though it is worth noting that 
only California and Washington put direct obligations on providers; the others merely placed 
conditions on state contracts. Maine also passed legislation adopting the FCC’s defunct ISP-
specific privacy rules – which seems odd because the FCC’s focus on ISPs stemmed from its 
inability to regulate other Internet companies, a jurisdictional limitation that did not plague the 
Maine legislature.12  
 
In some ways, the California statute mirrored (sometimes word-for-word) the repealed Open 
Internet Order. Like the Open Internet Order, SB-822 regulates the following activities: 
 
• Transparency: broadband providers must accurately disclose information about 
their network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of their 
offerings sufficient for consumers to make an informed choice among providers 
and for edge providers to develop and maintain offerings; 
• Blocking: broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications, 
services, or nonharmful devices, subject to reasonable network management; 
• Throttling: broadband providers cannot impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic 
on the basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a nonharmful 
device, subject to reasonable network management; and 
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• Paid Prioritization: providers cannot engage in paid prioritization, defined as 
management of an Internet service provider’s network to directly or indirectly 
favor some traffic over other traffic, either in exchange for consideration or to 
benefit an affiliated entity. 
 
The California statute also adopts the FCC’s broad general conduct standard contained in the 
Open Internet Order, which had prevented broadband providers from “[u]nreasonably interfering 
with, or unreasonably disadvantaging, either an end user’s ability to select, access, and use 
broadband Internet access service or the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or 
devices of the end user’s choice, or an edge provider’s ability to make lawful content, 
applications, services, or devices available to end users.” 
 
But in other ways, the California statute goes beyond even the restrictions that had been imposed 
by the Obama-era FCC. These include: 
 
• Zero Rating: SB-822 prohibits broadband providers from “zero-rating” traffic 
(defined as exempting some traffic from a customer’s monthly data allowance) in 
exchange for any consideration, or zero-rating some content within a category but 
not all similarly-situated applications. In the 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC 
explicitly declined commenters’ invitation to ban zero-rating. The order 
recognized that zero-rating can benefit consumers, and that any potentially 
anticompetitive practices would be addressed on a case-by-case basis under the 
general conduct standard.13 During the two years that the Open Internet Order 
was in effect, the agency never took action to prohibit a zero-rating practice. 
• Interconnection: SB-822 prohibits broadband providers from entering into traffic 
exchange agreements that have the purpose or effect of evading the statute’s 
restrictions. It also prohibits payment from an edge provider in exchange for 
delivery of traffic to end-users, effectively setting a rate of zero for direct 
interconnection agreements (such as the agreements that various broadband 
providers entered into with Netflix’s OpenConnect content delivery network). By 
comparison, the Open Internet Order explicitly declined to apply its rules to 
Internet traffic exchange agreements, choosing instead to review interconnection 
complaints against broadband providers under a just and reasonable standard.14  
• Specialized Services: SB-822 prohibits broadband providers from offering other 
services (such as IP television, VoIP, heart monitors, or alarm services) over the 
same last-mile network as broadband service, if the service has the “purpose and 
effect of evading” the statute, or if they “negatively affect the performance of 
broadband…access.” This effectively requires providers to prioritize broadband 
over other services. The 2015 Open Internet Order explicitly found that such 
services were beyond the scope of the order unless they were the “functional 
equivalent” of broadband or are used to evade the rules.15 
 
Importantly, the law explicitly subjects wireless broadband providers to the same restrictions that 




California Governor Jerry Brown signed SB-822 into law on September 30, 2018. The same day, 
the federal government and industry trade groups filed suit alleging that the RIF Order 
preempted SB-822.16 California could not defend on the ground that the RIF Order is invalid, as 
the Hobbs Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeal to determine the validity of 
FCC orders.17 At the time, the RIF Order had been challenged by several parties – including 
California – in the D.C. Circuit case Mozilla v. FCC. Therefore, California agreed to voluntarily 
stay SB-822, and plaintiffs agreed to stay their challenges to SB-822, until the Mozilla case was 
completed. 
 
III. The Mozilla Decision 
 
In Mozilla, a collection of plaintiffs, including California and several other states, argued the RIF 
Order was invalid. The complaint alleged that the FCC lacked statutory authority to classify 
broadband as a Title I information service and that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
by failing to justify its decision. The complaint also took aim at the RIF Order’s broad 
preemption clause, which purported to preempt “any state or local requirements that are 
inconsistent with the federal deregulatory approach we adopt today” (a clause that the Mozilla 
court deemed the “Preemption Directive”).18 
 
The D.C. Circuit largely upheld the order. Unsurprisingly, it found the legal challenge was 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s Brand X decision, which held that the FCC was free to 
choose whether to classify broadband as a Title I information service or Title II 
telecommunications service.19 It also found that the agency’s ultimate conclusions, that 
consumers are best protected by robust transparency requirements backstopped by consumer 
protection and antitrust law, and that the additional regulatory burden of the Open Internet 
Order's regulations were harmful to consumers and competition, were reasonable.20 The court 
did remand for additional explanation on three issues, but none of them were significant enough 
to warrant vacatur of the order.21 
 
The Mozilla court did invalidate one key part of the RIF Order: the Preemption Directive. The 
court found that the agency failed to ground the clause in a lawful source of statutory authority.22 
The court correctly noted that the Commission may preempt state law “only when and if it is 
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.”23 But the court found that the 
two grounds offered by the agency – the Impossibility Exception and the federal policy of 
nonregulation of information services – were insufficient to support a directive that preempted 
state law regulating “any aspect of broadband service…addressed in the Order.”24 
 
But importantly, while the court invalidated the order’s express preemption clause, it was careful 
to preserve the issue of conflict preemption.  The court stressed that “the sweeping Preemption 
Directive…goes far beyond conflict preemption,” a defect that the court found was “fatal.”25 But 
the court explicitly declined to decide whether state laws survive a conflict analysis, finding this 
question “wholly premature.”26 The Court was correct here: to find that a state law conflicts with 
a federal order, one needs to, well, have a state law to compare it to. There were no state laws at 




Thus, while net neutrality advocates found a silver lining in Mozilla’s ruling on the Preemption 
Directive, their celebration is, at a minimum, premature. The court made clear that striking the 
Preemption Directive did not give states license to enact statutes that conflict with the RIF 
Order: Mozilla states clearly that the “suggestion that the court's decision leaves no room for 
implied preemption confuses (i) the scope of the Commission's authority to expressly preempt, 
with (ii) the (potential) implied preemptive effect of the regulatory choices the Commission 
makes that are within its authority.”27 
 
The Mozilla plaintiffs elected not to seek Supreme Court review, announcing that the net 
neutrality “fight is best pursued” at “the state level…as well as other fronts including Congress 
or a future FCC.”28 On July 6, 2020, the filing deadline passed for a writ of certiorari, thus 
ending the Mozilla case – and the stay in the SB-822 litigation. Pursuant to the district court’s 
briefing schedule, the federal and industry plaintiffs filed renewed motions for a preliminary 
injunction on August 5, arguing again that the California statute is preempted by federal law. 
Free State Foundation President Randolph May joined an amicus brief filed on August 19. 
California’s opposition is due on September 30, and any reply brief is due October 14. 
 
IV. The Case for Preemption 
 
It’s important to note that, while the FCC has changed direction repeatedly over the proper 
regulatory treatment of broadband providers, a bipartisan consensus has consistently supported 
preemption of state broadband regulation. The 2010 Open Internet Order announced it would 
preempt state laws on a case-by-case basis that interfered with valid federal objectives.29 The 
2015 Open Internet Order was more explicit, explaining it would preempt “state regulations that 
would conflict with the federal regulatory framework or otherwise frustrate federal broadband 
policies.”30 And, of course, the RIF Order expressed an intent to preempt state law as well, 
though the Mozilla court found its ambition outstripped its authority. More generally, the 
Commission has consistently supported a federal policy of nonregulation of information services, 
preempting state power grabs over services such as interconnected VoIP.31 
 
Against that backdrop, and the Mozilla court’s explicit reservation of conflict preemption issues, 
there remain several grounds upon which plaintiff challengers can argue that SB-822 is 
preempted in whole or in part by state law. This section assesses those arguments. 
 
A. Wireless Net Neutrality: Express Preemption by the Communications Act 
 
The strongest preemption argument is in the wireless context. Section 332 of the 
Communications Act expressly preempts state authority “to regulate the entry of or rates charged 
by any” commercial or private mobile service.32 As the agency charged with interpreting Section 
332, the FCC has read the term “rates charged” broadly to include state regulation of “rate levels 
and rate structures,” such as whether wireless phone providers can charge for calls in whole-
minute increments and whether they can charge for both incoming and outgoing calls.33 Under 
Section 332, states are prohibited from prescribing “the rate elements” of mobile service and 
“specifying which among the [mobile] services provided can be subject to charges by [mobile] 
providers.”34 The Commission has also preempted state efforts to indirectly regulate rates, for 
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example by requiring state review and preapproval of a rate change, or a requirement that a 
carrier cannot change a rate without the affirmative consent of the subscriber.35 
 
Much of SB-822 does precisely what Section 332 forbids: it regulates the rates that a wireless 
broadband provider may charge for service.36 Most obviously, it prohibits wireless providers 
from zero-rating (exempting some data from a customer’s monthly data allowance), which 
directly regulates “the rate levels and rate structures” of mobile broadband by marking a certain 
rate structure off-limits to mobile providers. The prohibition on paid prioritization effectively 
sets a rate – of zero – for priority delivery of congestion-sensitive traffic over the last-mile 
network. Similarly, the interconnection requirement prohibits wireless providers from charging 
to accept traffic onto the broadband network, which also effectively sets a rate of zero for 
network peering.  
 
California may argue that the prohibitions on blocking and throttling fall within Section 332’s 
savings clause. While preempting state regulation of wireless entry and rates, the act clarifies that 
“this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating the other terms and conditions of 
commercial mobile services.”37 Setting aside the fact that the RIF Order classifies mobile 
broadband as a “private” rather than a “commercial” mobile service, the savings clause is 
unavailing. The blocking and throttling prohibitions affect wireless rates by preventing wireless 
companies from charging for delivery of content to an end-user. Depending on how California 
courts interpret the definition of “broadband provider,” these restrictions could also prohibit 
providers from offering low-price plans that include only selected Internet content (such as the 
unlimited talk, text, and social media plan for teenagers that Sprint once piloted, but withdrew in 
the face of criticism that such a plan “blocked” non-social-media sites).38 Courts have held that 
the savings clause permits states to impose consumer protection requirements on wireless 
providers, if they reflect the “neutral application of state contractual or fraud laws” to the 
wireless industry.39 But the blocking and throttling prohibitions are industry-specific prohibitions 
that affect wireless rates, and therefore are unlikely to fall within the savings clause. 
 
B. Conflict Preemption: Frustration of Federal Purpose 
 
More generally, plaintiffs can – and do – argue that SB-822 is preempted by the Supremacy 
Clause. As noted above, the Mozilla court reserved this issue, which was not properly before it: 
“Because a conflict-preemption analysis involves fact-intensive inquiries, it mandates deferral of 
review until an actual preemption of a specific state regulation occurs. Without the facts of any 
alleged conflict before us, we cannot begin to make a conflict-preemption assessment in this 
case.”40 In a properly presented case, Mozilla states, “[i]f the Commission can explain how a 
state practice actually undermines the 2018 Order, then it can invoke conflict preemption.”41 In 
this case, plaintiffs argue that conflict preemption is appropriate because SB-822 frustrates the 
accomplishment of a federal objective.  
 
Although the boundaries of this branch of conflict preemption are not clearly defined, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. is instructive.42 The Geier 
Court evaluated whether a state law requiring all cars to be equipped with airbags conflicted with 
a Department of Transportation standard that required airbags on only some automobiles. The 
federal agency had considered an all-airbag standard, but ultimately rejected it because of 
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concerns that public backlash would render the standard ineffective.43 The plaintiff argued that 
while the federal standard set a minimum airbag standard nationally, states were free to set more 
stringent requirements above that federal minimum.44 But the court found otherwise: the 
majority explained that the agency “deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of 
choices among different passive restraint devices” designed to “bring about a mix of different 
devices introduced gradually over time.”45 Although the agency could have mandated an all-
airbag standard, it consciously adopted a less stringent rule and explained its reasons for doing 
so. The court found that the state all-airbag rule “frustrated the accomplishment of a federal 
objective” because it “presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal 
regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed.”46  
 
As I discussed at greater length in an earlier FSF Perspectives article,47 the conflict between SB-
822 and the RIF Order parallels the conflict in Geier. Like the Transportation Department, the 
FCC had a wide range of options to regulate broadband network management practices. At one 
pole, it could have found broadband was a Title I information service and applied no regulation 
whatsoever. At the other pole, it could have found broadband was a Title II service and imposed 
a full suite of common carriage obligations, including rate regulation and tariffing, reminiscent 
of the regime that governed the Bell telephone monopoly. And given the flexibility of Title I 
ancillary authority and Title II forbearance, the FCC had many options between these poles. Like 
the Transportation Department, the FCC deliberately chose a middle ground: stringent 
transparency requirements, coupled with general consumer protection and antitrust law to protect 
consumers against abuse. And like the Transportation Department, the FCC considered and 
deliberately rejected the more stringent regulation pressed by the states: the FCC explained that it 
found the Open Internet Order’s common carriage-like regulations were likely to cause harm to 
consumers and to innovation – a conclusion that the Mozilla court found was reasonable. 
 
Like the state airbag rule in Geier, SB-822 frustrates the accomplishment of a federal objective 
by erecting an obstacle to the regulatory scheme that the federal agency deliberately imposed. 
Like Geier, California could argue that the federal order merely set a regulatory minimum that 
states are free to exceed. But like the Transportation Department, the FCC styled its order as a 
deliberate policy choice to regulate this far and no further. It elucidated clear reasons why 
additional regulation would harm the broadband ecosystem, rejecting in particular the very 
blocking, throttling, and prioritization regulations that California sought to impose. In this 
context, a faithful application of Geier would suggest that SB-822 interferes with the carefully 





Ultimately, SB-822 and similar efforts in other states are driven largely by policy disagreements 
with the Trump Administration. There are multiple avenues for opponents, even within state 
government, to influence federal policy. California could, and did, file comments in the RIF 
Order proceeding, and it participated actively in the Mozilla litigation testing the validity of the 
final order. Moreover, states generally may flex their regulatory muscle in many areas that the 
federal government cannot or will not regulate; indeed, the idea of states as “laboratories” for 




But SB-822 is not limited to intrastate communications that the Communications Act places in 
the state’s wheelhouse, but instead regulates interstate communications in ways that the FCC has 
determined would be harmful to federal efforts. Preemption doctrines can, and should, cabin 
state power where experimentation becomes balkanization and interferes with an overarching 
federal objective. 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, a Professor at Boston College Law School, is a Member of the Free State 
Foundation's Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an independent, 
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